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Article 2

AVOIDING DANGEROUS OR VITAL MILITARY SERVICE:
INTENT IN SHORT DESERTION
Alfred Avins*
A. General considerations
Military desertion has traditionally been regarded as a most heinous
species of military offense. To desert the service of one's country is considered
the ultimate in neglect of a soldier's duties.
Of all the categories of desertion, shirking vital or hazardous duty, which
usually occurs in time of war, is probably foremost in the catalogue of a soldier's
crimes.' The performance of duty hazardous in itself and vital to the national
welfare is the very reason for maintaining an armed force. Hence, the dereliction
of deliberately avoiding it is punished with severity.
Article 85 (a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides as follows:
Any member of the armed forces of the United States who . . .
(2) quits his unit or organization or place of duty with intent to
avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service . . . is guilty of
desertion.
The above section of the article punishing desertion is a relatively recent
addition to the military law, and is commonly known as "short desertion" or,
sometimes, "constructive desertion." This form of desertion is mainly of interest
during time of war when armed combat necessitates the performance of many
hazardous duties.
The two most common forms of dereliction forbidden by this section of
the statute are absence without leave from a unit engaged in combat or about
to go into combat, commonly referred to as "battlefield desertion," and absence
without leave from a unit about to be shipped abroad, commonly called "embarkation desertion." The former can only be committed in time of war or
similar hostilities, while the latter, although more frequent in time of war, is
not confined to such periods.
Although the statute was designed to punish unauthorized absences from
duty of national importance it does not talk in terms of whether the soldier
has missed the particular service involved. Indeed, it is settled law that a
soldier can be punished for deserting "with intent to avoid hazardous duty"
even though he ultimately performed the duty which he had deserted to avoid.2
The statute does not denounce the missing of vital or dangerous duties, but an
unauthorized absence with an "intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk
important service."
- B.A., LL.B., LL.M.; Assistant Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School; member
of Bars of New York, District of Columbia, Florida, United States Supreme Court, United
States 'Court of Military Appeals. This article was written as part of the author's graduate
work at the University of Chicago Law School. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professors Rheinstein, Allen, and Kaplan, tfor their encouragement and assistance.
1 See E.T.O. 15227, Mason, 29 E.T.O. 17, 19 (1945), where the board of review
declared that "the evidence is therefore legally sufficient to sustain the conviction for the
despicable offense of deserting the service of the United States in battle, for which he
merits the disdain of courageous men and punishment by the country he would not serve."
2 E.T.O. 2368, Lybrand, 6 E.T.O. 333, 342 (1944): "The evidence that accused
actually sailed with his organization lacks significance with respect to the intent that it
would otherwise have in his favor . . . because of evidence that the embarkation was unintended and involuntary on his part."
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The necessity of focusing on the intent of the accused, rather than on the
objective fact as to whether he missed duties which the law can denominate
as "hazardous" or "important," radically changes the manner in which the
statute operates from that which would be true if the test were a wholly objective one not depending on the accused's mental state. This article will explore
some of the problems raised by gearing the offense of short desertion to the
mental state of a soldier, rather than to the physical results of his acts in actually
missing duties.
B. Time of formation of intent
Article of War 28 of 1920, in substantially the same language as is used
today, branded as a deserter one "who quits his organization or place of duty
with the intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service." The
1921 Manual for Courts-Martial,in interpreting this section provided that to
prove the offense, the prosectition must show:
2. That at the time he absented himself either the organization
to which he belonged, or he himself, was under orders or anticipated orders involving either (a) hazardous duty or (b) some
important service, and that his absence without leave was so timed
duty
as to appear calculated to enable him to avoid such hazardous
3
or to shirk such important service, as the case may be.
Just so there can be no mistake as to the significance of the words "at the time
he absented himself," the preceding clause, defining the proof for regular desertion, provides that "he intended, at the time of absenting himself or at some
time during his absence, to remain away permanently." 4 Thus, the 1921
Manual contrasts sharply the time when the requisite intent must be formed
as respects these two different forms of desertion. The wording of the 1921
Manual comported with the then common understanding of the offense of
desertion.
The very name "short desertion"' denotes a relatively brief AWOL, during
which it could hardly be expected that an accused could formulate and also
put into effect a plan for evasion of duty unless he had formed the requisite
intent prior to his absence. Indeed, if the accused does not form the necessary
intent before leaving, his absence will in all probability prevent him from learning of impending duty which he would desire to avoid by staying away longer.
The special situation which prompted enactment of the statute, wholesale desertion at the last minute before embarkation or combat,' which is also reflected
in the discussion in the 1921 Manual of this offense,' corroborates this conclusion.
The 1928 Manual was not so careful. In the section on proof of desertion,
it stated:
(b) that he intended, at the time of absenting himself or at some
time during his absence, to remain away permanently from such
3 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY, 1921, para. 409, p. 344.
4 Ibid.
5 Id. at 343.
6 Hearings on S. 64, A Bill to Establish Military Justice, pp. 763, 1158-59, 1162, Before
a Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919).
7. Supra 3 at 344.
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place, or to avoid hazardous duty, or to shirk important service as
alleged."
This above section came before a board of review of the European Theater of
Operations in United States v. Perry.' In that case the staff judge advocate
stated in his review that although the evidence of intent to avoid service at the
beginning of accused's unauthorized absence might have been inadequate, the
evidence showed that the accused "conceived, entertained, and acted upon
the positive mental intent to continue the period of their absence without leave
for the specific purpose of avoiding combat duty."
The board of review held that conceiving the intent after the AWOL
had commenced was not sufficient to constitute the offense. After noting that
the 1921 Manual "did not apply the principle [of forming intent after the
absence had commenced] to the quoted portion of Article of War 28, whose
provisions were unambiguous to the effect that the intent to avoid hazardous
duty or shirk important service must concur in point of time with the quitting
of accused's organization or place of duty," the board declared of the abovequoted section of the 1928 Manual:
To the extent that this provision attempts to extend or amplify the
unambiguous provisions of Article of War 28 it is unauthorized
administrative legislation. It is hardly necessary to rely upon the
principle of strict construction of penal statutes to reach this conclusion. Well established principles governing the elements of the
offense of desertion under Article of War 28 indicate that the
requisite intent must be entertained by the absentee at the time
he quits his organization or place of duty in order to be guilty of
a violation of that Article. (Emphasis by Board of Review.) 10
It is noteworthy that this is the only case found before 1951 where a
board of review struck down a provision of the Manual for Courts-Martialas
in conflict with the Articles of War, a situation in sharp contrast to that now
prevailing where the Court of Military Appeals rather often strikes down provisions of the Manual which appear to it to conflict with the Uniform Code
of Military Justice." Notwithstanding the uniqueness of the performance, the
several boards of review in the European Theater of Operations were careful
to follow United States v. Perry thereafter.'
The point, however, does not
seem to have arisen in any other board of review in any other theater or in
Washington.
Despite the disregard of the above provision of the 1928 Manual in board
of review decisions, it was copied verbatim into the 1949 manual.'" The 1951
Manual avoids the issue by simply quoting the statutory terminology. 4 There
8 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. Army, 1928, para. 130a, p. 143.
9 E.T.O. 5958, Perry, 16 E.T.O. 61 (1945).
10 Id. at 70.
11 Fratcher, PresidentialPower to Regulate Military justice; A Critical Study of Decisions
of the Court of Military Appeals, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 861 (1959).
12 E.T.O. 8147, Pierce, 19 E.T.O. 21, 25 (1945); E.T.O. 8700, Straub, 20 E.T.O. 1
(1945); E.T.O. 8708, Lee, 20 E.T.O. 15 (1945); E.T.O. 9565, Strange, 21 E.T.O. 89
(1945); E.T.O. 11869, Hise, 24 E.T.O. 342, 344 (1945); E.T.O. 12044, May, 25 E.T.O. 11,
12 (1945); E.T.O. 13103, Israel, 26 E.T.O. 125, 127 (1945); E.T.O. 13961, De Carlo, 27
E.T.O. 151, 153 (1945).
13 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY, 1949, para. 146a, p. 198.
14 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. 1951, para. 164a, p. 312.
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is nothing to indicate, however, that the drafters were even aware of the problem. 5
The state of the law today is uncertain. In United States v. Shull,'" Judge
Brosman assumed that a conviction of short desertion would be sustained if
the intent was formed "at the inception of or during his established unauthorized
absence,"" without discussing the point or indicating awareness of the conflict
with prior cases. Judge Latimer in a dissent stated that "The law does not
require that the intent to shirk important service be formed at the inception
of the absence, it can be formed at any time while in that status."'" Here again,
no awareness of prior decisions, or even a discussion of the point, was shown.
And in United States v. Taylor,'" Judge Latimer reiterated that "It is not essential that the Government prove the intent was formed at the inception of the
absence."" 0 This dictum was neither necessary to the decision nor discussed
at all.
The question of what the present interpretation ought to be is a close one.
Arguing in favor of a construction that the intent must be formed at the time
of the inception of the absence is the probability that this was the original understanding in 1920 and that the drafters of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
did not intend to change the law. A contrary argument is that the drafters of
the Code probably obtained their ideas of what the law was from the 1949
Manual, and in all probability, insofar as they did not change the statute itself,
generally intended to continue the Manual's interpretation of the law.
Therefore, insofar as the scanty legislative history fights itself to a draw,
we must look to policy grounds to resolve this question. It is submitted that,
as a matter of policy, an intent formed at any time during absence should be
sufficient. If this were the case, the law as to intent in short desertion would
be brought in line with that governing regular desertion. This would not only
eliminate a possible source of confusion, but also recognize the fact that as a
practical matter an intention to evade hazardous or important duty formed
during an absence is just as detrimental to the armed forces as one formed
at the inception of the absence. In both cases the military is deprived of the
man's services at a critical time. Thus, the more recent dictum of the Court of
Military Appeals should be preferred to the older cases.
C. Intent and motive
The general rule in criminal law is that evidence of good motive for the
commission of a crime is no defense even when specific intent is required.2
This rule has been applied to the offense of short desertion under a wide variety
of circumstances.
The easiest situation to resolve occurs where the accused alleges that he
15

The discussion in the

LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE BASIS, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,

U.S., 1951, p. 252, does not touch this point.
16 1 U.S.C.M.A. 177, 2 C.M.R. 83 (1952).
17 Id. at 179, 185.
18 Id. at 185, 191.
19 2 U.S.C.M.A. 389, 9 C.M.A. 19 (1953).
20 Id. at 392, 422. See United States v. LaRue, 13 C.M.R. 296 (C.M., 1953).
21 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 31; 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVMENcE § 166, p. 322,
(12th ed. 1955); 1 CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF CRiMEs 150-51, (1900).
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sought to avoid hazardous or important duty because unqualified for it. Thus,
boards of review have rejected defenses that accused was physically unfit for
field duty,22 that he had a feeling of inadequacy, 2 that "he was going into the
company as a soldier, for which he had no training, instead of being a cook,
for which he was trained,"' 4 that "he believed himself unqualified for front
line duty,"" and that "he 'figured' he 'wasn't a rifleman.' "26 As one board
declared:
Accused's statement . .. was that he had an earache . .. [but] he
admitted his fright . . . [This] would not excuse him. Military
experience is that cowards will use any excuse, however slight, to

the lives of their comrades and the country
evade duty, even 2though
7
itself are in peril.

The above rule has even been applied where the accused alleged that his
actions were motivated, not for his own good, but the good of the service. Thus, in
one case the accused sought relief from his duties as a combat platoon leader
because of his own estimation that he was not able to handle the responsibility.
When such relief was denied on the eve of battle, accused went AWOL. The
board held that "his motive was to promote the welfare of members of his
platoon and others by removing himself from his command, [but] his intention
was to avoid the hazardous duty and shirk the important service of performing
that command in combat,"" and upheld the conviction.
In all the above cases, whether the actions of the accused were motivated
by fear or otherwise," effective realization of the desires of the accused required
that he actually miss the duty he allegedly shirked. Hence there is really no
problem in finding the requisite specific intent. A more difficult issue is presented where the accused deserted for reasons other than the desire to avoid
hazardous duty, and during the period of desertion did in fact miss such duty.
The earliest case to present this problem completely avoided the issue.'"
There, the accused knew his battery was due to embark soon for overseas duty;
indeed, his bags were already packed for the trip. He received his pay that
day, and proceeded to go AWOL and drink up the proceeds. When he sobered
up three days later, he returned voluntarily from the binge. His statement that
he "didn't think much about" going AWOL, coming from a soldier of "four
22 C.M. 262836, Parmelee, 41 B.R. 159, 167 (1944).
23 United States v. Brooks, 1 C.M.R. 118, 123 (C.M., 1951), aff'd 1 U.S.C.M.A. 88,
1 C.M.R. 88 (1951).
24 M.T.O. 5890, Vollaro, 6 N.A.T.O.-M.T.O. 149 (1945).
25 E.T.O. 15138, Leslie, 28 E.T.O. 329, 331-32 (1945).
26 E.T.O. 9565, Strange, 21 E.T.O. 89, 92 (1945).
27 E.T.O. 8448, Tracy, 19 E.T.O. 201, 202 (1945). See also E.T.O. 12470, Mayo, 25
E.T.O. 195 (1945), where the board declared at 197:
If a man leaves existing hazardous duty and intends thereby to escape
it, the law is not that he will be excused if personal reasons were a contributing cause. The law instead is that a man must subject his person
and its desires to the service of his country, and stand and fight for the
country's sake until death if necessary, though his whims or tragedies or
personality or fears make him wish to be elsewhere. Any less severe rule
would subordinate discipline to caprice and cowardice.
28 E.T.O. 9257, Schewe, 20 E.T.O. 163, 168 (1945).
29 Cf. E.T.O. 2368, Lybrand, 6 E.T.O. 333, 336, 341 (1944) (disliked present unit of
assignment).
30 E.T.O. 105, Fowler, 1 E.T.O. 91 (1942).
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or five years of service and experience," horrified the board of review, which
held that he "exhibited a spirit of such callous indifference to his obligations
and duties as a soldier that the court was justified in concluding that his departure and absence were intentional and deliberate."' 1
The problem that the case avoided was whether the mere fact that the
AWOL was intentional made the accused guilty of intent to avoid foreign
service. A subsequent case, however, made it clear that this was the legal
doctrine on which the prior decision had rested." In that case the accused
had a known propensity for drink. Shortly before his unit was expecting to
resist an enemy counter-attack, accused went AWOL to get drunk, and so
overindulged that he lost all sense of responsibility for performance of "essential duty at a crucial time." The board of review held that "his willingness
to put himself hors de combat through drink necessarily involved an intention
to shirk his duty, hazardous duty at that particular time and known by him to
be such." The board further stated:
When a man has a known duty to perform, a deliberate engagement by him in conduct which he knows will render impossible
performance by him of his duty certainly carries with it, legally,
an intent not to perform his duty. And if as a consequence of his
misconduct, involving such intent to flout duty, he separates himself
from his command, he can properly be said to have intentionally
absented himself. (Emphasis added).
Accordingly it is the opinion of the Board of Review that under
the circumstances there was an intentional absenting of himself
by accused from his command to avoid hazardous duty. Article of
War 28 does not condemn such conduct only when it is inspired
by fear. It is probably far worse for a man to keep out of combat
through laziness or through preference for a few hours sleep than
it is for a youngster who is so afraid that his feet won't move. The
language of Article of War 28 is certainly susceptible of this conclusion."3
The above doctrine was adhered to in a later case in the same theater where
an accused failed to join his organization which was pulling out for combat
because of his desire to gamble. The board declared that "even if his actions
were motivated by a desire to gamble rather than by fear, he necessarily intended to shirk the hazardous duty which his gambling prevented him from
performing."' 4
Even the strict World War II decisions were confined to the proposition
31 Id. at 93.
32 E.T.O. 6626, Lipscomb, 17 E.T.O. 127 (1945).
33 Id. at 130.
34 E.T.O. 10690, Nolan, 23 E.T.O. 17, 20 (1945). See also United States v. Parker,
2 C.M.R. 457, 460 (C.M., 1952), where the board declared:
Accused . . . [stated] that he departed from Company I with the intent to
avoid a transfer to Company L, believing such transfer would delay his
return home. He added that he did not consider his job in "Forward Supply" as hazardous duty, and that he did not know what his job would be
in Company L. Even if we accept the accused's testimony as credible, the
interference is inescapable that the accused by his absence was attempting
to avoid the -hazards and perils which face a rifle company in the immediate operations against the enemy.
And see United States v. Barnett, 8 C.M.R. 653 (A.C.M., 1953), which although not explicit,

looks in the same direction.
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that an intent to go AWOL would be considered an intent to avoid particular
duty only when absence at the particular time inevitably resulted in nonperformance of the duty. Where there was a chance that the duty might still
be performed the intent was not inferred.
A good illustration of this rule is found in one case wherein accused's unit
had packed its bags, been issued rations, and was restricted to base, pending a
move which would shortly occur. The soldier had previously left the last several
nights to see his English sweetheart and always returned voluntarily. On the
night in question, accused left camp at 8:30 P.M. to ask the girl to marry him,
since he stated that his unit "might be leaving that night." After the girl had
accepted his proposal, which was at 11:30 P.M., he started back to camp,
walking 18 miles and arriving at about 6:30 the next morning. His unit had
moved out in the middle of the night without him, and when the soldier returned he was arrested in barracks. The board could not find that this romantic
interlude indicated an intent to avoid the move, saying that while "he was
taking a chance" of missing the movement, the voluntary return and the short
duration of absence negatived the requisite intent."s Thus, at the time the Code
was passed, the prevailing doctrine was that since a person is deemed to intend
the natural and probable consequences of his acts, if the natural and probable
consequences of accused's acts were such that he would miss hazardous or
important service, then he was deemed to so intend even though missing such
service had no relation to the reason why he went absent.
The first case to reach the Court of Military Appeals involving this problem, wherein an accused on shipment orders overstayed his leave to deal with
domestic problems, did not directly consider the question posed by the above
cases. " However, shortly thereafter the court did have to face this problem.
In United States v. Apple," the accused was in the front lines in Korea in a
defensive position being subjected to enemy fire. He went AWOL for 13 days,
and on trial claimed that he did not absent himself to avoid hazardous duty,
but rather to see what had occasioned the confusion in his records with respect
to rotation points. The court held that since "as a matter of law, the offense
is not committed by reason of a naked unauthorized absence, without more,
from a unit engaged in hazardous duty," (emphasis added), the law officer
was in error in not instructing as to the lesser included offense of AWOL reasonably raised by accused's testimony. The court declared:
In terms of legal distinction it is manifest that desertion with intent
to avoid hazardous duty is not identical with absence without leave
from a unit engaged in hazardous duty. Instead, the entertainment
of a particular purpose lies at the very heart of the desertion offense.
...If accused's story on the stand was true, he did not desert his
unit with intent to avoid hazardous duty. Although he may in fact
have avoided it, his object instead was to secure clarification of his
confused rotation point situation ....
Our holding here in no sense
involves a failure to recognize fully the distinction between "intent"
35 E.T.O. 564, Neville, 2 E.T.O. 135, 140-41 (1943). See C.M. 272610, Armas, 46
B.R. 319 (1945), for a similar case.
36 United States v. Shull, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 177, 2 C.M.R. 83 (1952).
37 2 U.S.C.M.A. 592, 10 C.M.R. 90 (1953).
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and "motive" . . . traditional in the common law of crimes.3
(Emphasis added)
While the Court of Military Appeals neither discussed nor specifically
overruled the prior cases, it is clear that they no longer can be said to represent
prevailing law. And of the two views, it seems that the more recent cases are
to be preferred. The fiction that all persons are deemed to intend the natural
and probable consequences of their actions does not assist analysis in this situation, where the extra-heavy punishment is not directed towards the non-performance of duty, but towards the purposeful evasion of duty. If this were
otherwise, a soldier who failed to perform important or hazardous duty because
he overslept and became AWOL in his sleep -a
perfectly possible result in
military law - could be charged with desertion even though the only time
he could formulate the requisite intent was while sleeping, a factually absurd
conclusion which not even the old cases were willing to accept.3 9
The statute, however, directs its attention to an intent which can by its
nature only be fulfilled through avoidance of the duty and which intent is
pernicious because its effectuation necessarily entails nonperformance of critical duty. Other intents may or may not result in nonperformance of duty,
depending on factors over which the accused not only has no control but by
hypothesis is unconcerned with. To predicate the offense on other intents
entails an inquiry as to how probable nonperformance of duty must be, an
investigation which is by its very nature doomed to failure since no satisfactory
dividing line can ever be drawn between cases wherein accused took a slim
chance of nonperformance, where he took a considerable chance, and where
he was almost certain to miss important or hazardous duty. No one who has
had any experience with military service can doubt the proposition that if there
is anything certain about military duties it is that both the time and necessity
for their performance is uncertain, and the degree of uncertainty rises in proportion to the unusual, special, or extraordinary nature of the duty involved.
To charge the accused with hindsight in evaluating the certainty of the duty
is unfair, and to attempt to evaluate the probability as it seemed to him based
on the information he is supposed to have possessed and the insights he is supposed to have had is too slippery a test to amount to more than a guessing game.
Nor is such an illusory yardstick necessary for any proper purpose. One
who goes AWOL for reasons other than avoiding a particular duty will by
hypothesis return when his ends are accomplished even though the duty, albeit
38 Id. at 593-94, 591-92. Accord: United States v. Squirrel, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 146, 7 C.M.R.
22 (1953); United States v. Wimp, 4 C.M.R. 509 (C.G.C.M., 1952); United States v.
Guthrie, 12 C.M.R. 299 (C.M., 1953); United States v. Victor, 24 G.M.R. 433 (C.M., 1957).
It might be noted that a World War II decision in a civilian court foreshadowed this rule. In
McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80, 89 (B. D. Va. 1943), the court said:
I do not believe, however, from the facts before me, that McCune left
the ship with the intent to avoid hazardous duty, or to shirk important service. He had "pitched in" in the emergency, and prepared meals for five hundred additional troops with little help. When the Major told him in effect, he
could not serve the officers, he could not serve the soldiers, he could not
clear the top side to complete the preparation of the meals for the crew,
until the Colonel was ready to eat, he felt he was unfairly treated, lost
his temper, and in a fit of passion, jumped over the side as the ship was
pulling away.
39 See E.T.O. 11869, Hise, 24 E.T.O. 342, 344 (1945).
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fortuitously, still awaits him. One who seeks to evade the duty, on the other
hand, will prolong his absence if need be to assure such evasion. Hence, nonperformance by the latter is much more likely. Accordingly, a rational distinction can be made between the two classes of offenders even on the level of
probability of nonperformance, and statutory coverage of the latter class alone
is justified.
D. Objective and subjective tests
Even though an accused may absent himself without authority and with
the specific purpose of avoiding a particular duty, the question still remains
whether the proper test requires a determination confined solely to, an inquiry
as to the accused's state of mind or whether the accused's purpose must be
measured by actual external facts. This inquiry can be broken down into two
questions: (1) must the accused actually be subject to the duty he intends to
shirk, and (2) is the nature of the duty to be determined by the accused's
attitude towards it or by the facts and law measured through objective standards?
The first question is probably easier to answer than the second. A person
who goes AWOL to attempt to avoid duty can only by definition intend to avoid
duty to which he will in the future be subjected, for even if he is currently
under orders to engage in the duty or is in fact so engaged at the time of
absence, the duty to be avoided is of necessity future duty. But as one board
put it, "since no one can have knowledge of the events of the future,"4 an
accused can never in logic go AWOL with knowledge that he will thereby
avoid hazardous duty or shirk important service, as it is always possible that
he would not be required to perform the duty had he remained. Accordingly,
in every case of short desertion, the intent can only be one of evasion of anticipated duty, and not known duty. Further, to make conviction turn on whether
the anticipation was correct would introduce into the case a host of fortuitous
circumstances occurring after accused's absence which turned accused's fears
into reality, and which he might have been totally unaware of at the time he
went AWOL. Indeed, if the time of anticipated duty had not yet arrived
when the trial is held, the court members would be required to shine up their
own crystal balls. Conviction or acquittal should not be made to depend on
factors so foreign to accused's own fault.
One case has suggested by way of dictum that it is sufficient if the accused
reasonably prognosticated his future activities.4 There, accused, along with his
unit, made an amphibious landing in southern France and pursued the Ger40
41
THE

O.M. 227845, Sapp, 15 B.R. 379, 381 (1943).
E.T.O. 8172, St. Dennis, 19 E.T.O. 77 (1945). SNEDEKER, MILITARY
UNIFORM CODE 575 (1953), states:

JUSTICE UNDER

Intent to avoid or shirk a non-existent but supposed hazardous duty or important service is not the intent required. If the duty or service is actually
impending at the time of the alleged intent, however, the fact that its requirement is subsequently cancelled or the fact that the nature of the duty or
service is subsequently changed to or becomes or turns out to be nonhazardous or unimportant does not negate the existence of the alleged
intent. On the other hand, if a duty or service is not hazardous or important
at the time of alleged intent, the fact that it subsequently becomes or turns
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mans as they retreated up the River Rhone. When the unit halted, accused
went AWOL to avoid further operations in the pursuit, stating: "I have seen
plenty of boys torn up and I did not want to get it." The board upheld a
conviction for short desertion, saying:
The prosecution was not required to prove that certain definite,
specific hazards were immediately in prospect and that accused
was cognizant of same. It sufficed if the evidence showed that
accused was a member of or present with an organization which
was engaged in a military mission where the hazards of death and
bodily injury or of imprisonment would be involved in the usual
course of events and that accused knew that these undisclosed perils awaited him and it was these perils he sought to avoid.
It would be a frustration of the purpose of Articles of War 58
and 28 if under the circumstances here disclosed the prosecution
was required to prove that particularand. specific hazards immediately awaited accused's organization in the performance of its
prescribed mission and that accused had knowledge of the same.
The statute does not require such restricted interpretation. Article
of War 28 denounced absence without leave "to avoid hazardous
duty." If the prosecution proved that accused was engaged in the
performance of a duty where these hazards ... although the time
and place of their occurrence or existence were unknown when
an accused left his organization . . .existed and that by course of
prior events or as a result thereof he must 'have known of their
future existence the burden of proof is sustained by the prosecution.4 2 (Emphasis added)
While there is some language in the above case about knowledge of the
future existence of hazards, which as noted previously is a logical impossibility,
the case can more reasonably be interpreted as requiring a reasonable anticipation of future hazards. Even this, however, is not a desirable test.
To start with, proving that the accused knew of facts which would create
in his mind a reasonable belief as to the existence of future perils, and that he
did so believe, is at best an uncertain undertaking." Even in those cases where
such proof is necessary because evidence of intent must be based on circumstantial evidence,44 the fact that the available evidence creates only a suspicion
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out to be hazardous or important is immaterial to the offense alleged. Thus,
the mere fact that the accused's unit became engaged in combat after the
accused's departure is insufficient to warrant an inference that such combat
was imminent at the time of the accused's departure.
St. Dennis, supra note 41 at 81.
See E.T.O. 8700, Straub, 20 E.T.O. 1, 5-6 (1945), where the board declared:
The prosecution apparently sought to charge accused with knowledge of
imminent hazardous duty by reason of the issuance of equipment and ammunition and the "common knowledge" that the company would not
remain long in Palenberg. In the face of the positive testimony in the record
that no one knew, at least before noon, 14 December 1944, whether or when
the company would leave Palenberg or whether it was scheduled to return
to the front, these circumstances are meager as a basis for the inference that
the company members knew of impending hazardous duty.

.

. .

there is

insufficient proof that accused as an individual was aware of them.
44 Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S., 1951, para. 164a, p. 314, states that "there should
be evidence of facts raising a reasonable inference that the accused knew with reasonable
certainty that he would be required for such hazardous duty or important service." This only
refers to proof by circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., GM 228619, Hammock, 16 BR 275, 277

(1943).
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and no more will be fatal to the case.45 To extend this requirement to cases
where the accused's intent is known creates a gaping loophole for recalcitrant
soldiers.
Moreover, neither logic nor fairness requires such a rule. It is perfectly
possible for a person to intend to avoid a certain result and to take steps to
effectuate this intent although he is firmly convinced that the probability of
the result occurring even without these steps is remote or small. Thousands of
fire, theft, and other casualty insurance policies are taken out every year by
persons who intend to avoid financial loss occasioned by the contingent event
and are taking steps to do so, even though they have good reason to believe that
the probability of their suffering the loss is not only mathematically remote but
can be so demonstrated by indisputable statistics. Certainly, the average male
civilian in his early twenties who takes out term life or health insurance has
a better chance of survival in good health than does a soldier for whom the
exigencies of active military service always hold unknown perils even under
the most peaceful conditions, yet no one would question the fact that the civilian
intends to avoid financial loss occasioned by such hazard and that he was taking
effectual and reasonable steps to do so. Recent events in American history,
such as the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the unforeseen invasion of
South Korea, are too fresh in our memories to be able to brand the specter of
hazardous duty or important service in almost any situation a wholly unreasonable apparition. To make the test depend on hindsight is unfair, and to evaluate the state of accused's thinking based on what he should have believed is
too amorphous a standard to be of any real value.
The need for the above rule is well illustrated in a case decided during
World War II.46 There accused went AWOL because he did not want to
serve overseas in the infantry. Although he was at the time of absence in an
infantry unit, and was scheduled to be transferred to a replacement depot from
which soldiers were shipped overseas just prior to his absence, there was no
evidence that he would have been shipped overseas at an early date or indeed
that he would not have remained in the replacement depot for the duration
of the war. Nevertheless, the board of review sustained the conviction for short
desertion, saying:
In some of the "inference" cases there is certain language
which indicates that to constitute this specific type of desertion
under Article of War 28, there must be proof that accused was in
fact, as distinguished from his belief, faced with the prospect of
prompt embarkation for overseas duty. However, the Article of
War does not state that such fact is an essential element of the
offense ....
Furthermore, in setting forth the essential elements of
proof of this offense the Manual does not include as one of them
45

46

See G.M. 228401, Webster, 16 B.R. 167, 171 (1943):
It may be added that although one may surmise from the other evidence
and the coincidence of his well-timed absence that the accused may have
possessed the cowardly purpose of deserting his comrades in order to avoid a
service perilous to them all, the Board of Review is under the duty of safeguarding the basic principle of American justice that in order to have a
legal conviction "A man must not only be guilty but he must be proven
guilty."
C.M. 270352, Uyechi, 45 B.R. 233 (1945).
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proof that accused in fact was scheduled for hazardous duty or
important service; it requires proof only that he intended to avoid
hazardous duty or shirk important service (MOM, 1928, par. 130).
In none of the cases in which this additional element was suggested
was it the turning point of the opinion or essential to the decision.
A careful reading of the embarkation cases indicates rather that it
was a somewhat ambiguous way of stating that in inferring the
intent of the accused, where there is no direct evidence thereof,
proof that in fact he was scheduled for prompt overseas shipment
and knew it established that he believed or had reason to believe
that his embarkation for overseas duty was imminent and justified
the court in inferring that his absence was with the intent to avoid
it. Our conclusion that imminent embarkation as a fact, as distinguished from accused's belief, is not an essential element of the
offense here alleged is supported by the opinion of the Board of
Review in CM 223300, Manashian, 13 B.R. 363. There the proof
established only that accused apprehended prompt embarkation for
overseas duty but there was no proof that such imminent embarkation existed in fact.
In the instant case ... at the time accused left his organization
.. . he believed that the organization would embark for overseas
service within the reasonably near future and that he absented himself with the specific intent of avoiding embarking with his organization. It is the opinion of the Board of Review that this constituted an intent to avoid hazardous duty within the meaning of
Article of War 28, and that, accordingly,
4 7 the evidence sustains the
findings of guilty of the offense alleged.
In the case above, the accused might never have been shipped overseas.
Numerous people in replacement depots were not so shipped. Moreover, had
he gone overseas he might never have seen combat or engaged in other hazardous
duty. He might have been transferred to another branch of service. The difficulties of evaluating all of these possibilities is ample demonstration of the utility
of limiting inquiry to the state of the accused's mind alone.
The second branch of inquiry, whether the test for hazardous duty and
important service should be subjective or objective, presents more difficult
problems. The extreme paucity of authority in this area requires that the reso47 Id. at 238. See also E.T.O. 14693, Zottoli, 28 E.T.O. 177, 181 (1945):
The hazardous duty is not shown to be immediate and of a specific nature.
There is no evidence of a particular nature that the company to which accused was about to be and was later assigned was actually in combat or
anticipated immediate combat. However, the date of accused's initial absence
is extremely significant in view of the well-known combat situation then
existing in the European Theater-a time when our forces, particularly the
infantry, were heavily engaged with the enemy and replacement depots were
functioning to the-utmost to maintain the units at the front with sufficient
men to replace casualties. The accused was in a replacement depot. He admitted that he knew he was going to be assigned as an infantry replacement
and said "I knew I just couldn't take it up there" (underscoring by BR).
This case does not present the problem of finding in the record evidence of
the immediate and specific hazardous duty of accused's unit from which
evidence it may be inferred that accused knew of the hazardous duty and
intended by his unauthorized absence to avoid it. Here the accused's statement clearly discloses both his knowledge of the dangers ahead and his
intent to avoid them. No question of inference is involved. The record is
legally sufficient.
But see United States v. Olson, 11 C.M.R. 613, 616 (N.C.M., 1953): "One cannot intend to
avoid a duty he does not know exists."
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lution of the problem rest on reason and policy alone. In so analyzing this
problem, it will be useful to consider the two categories of "hazardous duty"
and "important service" separately.
Before doing this, however, it will help focus attention on the problem to
note that the much-mooted question of whether a defendant can attempt a
crime impossible of completion is not of relevance here. In such a situation
the requisite specific intent is complete but the overt act cannot be carried into
fruition.4 8 Here, however, the overt act of going AWOL can be carried into
completion as an element of the crime. The question is whether the specific
intent is of the kind the offense requires.
Considering first the intent to avoid hazardous duty, we note at the outset
that it is not necessary that the casualty or fatality rate be 100 per cent, to
render the duty hazardous; in almost every duty there is some chance of survival, and hence few activities would qualify if this were required. Indeed,
some survived the famous charge of the Light Brigade during the Crimean
War, and the Japanese suicide squadrons during World War II. Likewise, a
slight chance of injury does not render a duty hazardous; otherwise, all activities
even the safest - would fall under this rubric. The true definition of "hazardous" covers those duties with such an unusually high casualty rate that
servic'emei are deterred thereby. The fact that anticipation in a particular
instance proves unfounded does not render the duty non-perilous if the type of
duty is generally considered hazardous.49
There are three variables in determining whether duty is hazardous, even
after an objective, statistical compilation has been made as to the casualty rate
in the particular activity. They are:
(1) The number of soldiers a true casualty picture would
affect. Stated otherwise, the first possibility is that everyone knows
objectively the actual hazard. A unit of statistical reporting clerks
would be likely to fall under this group.
(2) The belief of accused's comrades. If the group is large
enough, and the belief is commonly held, we can be fairly sure that
the belief, although perhaps not accurate, is reasonable and based
on some facts.9 0 The universe we may be interested in for this
inquiry will be all those facing the common hazard, and hence the
group to whom we are directing the deterrent effect of the statute.
This group may be geographical, for example, all personnel in a
48 Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 962
(1930); Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE L. J. 53
(1930).
49 E.T.O. 5953, Myers, 16 E.T.O. 57, 58-9 (1945); E.T.O. 5803, Alexander, 16 E.T.O. 1,
4 (1945). In E.T.O. 10743, Martin, 23 E.T.O. 117 (1945), the board of review declared at
120:
It was not necessary to show that the assault crossing, normally a hazardous operation, was, in fact, as hazardous as anticipated. The inference is compelling that accused absented himself to avoid the crossing-he declared
his intention. The material intent was his intent at the time he absented
himself without leave.
50 See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R. 2553, Career Compensation for the Uniformed
Forces (1949), p. 1765, where a doctor testified: "In the public eye, dealing with persons
afflicted with leprosy is dangerous. But we think the chance of a physician or dentist contacting
leprosy is practically nil. It is the type of duty that is disagreeable." However, a layman who
failed to take proper precautions would certainly subject himself to some risk.
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certain battle area facing an enemy offensive. We are interested
in only their reactions because if they think the activity non-hazardous, none of them will go AWOL to avoid it, even though others
think it perilous, and we will have our full complement of troops,
The group may also be occupational, for example, all fliers of jet
fighters. If they think the activity dangerous, some may absent
themselves to avoid it although people outside of the restricted
universe think it safe. These absences will none-the-less require a
counter-deterrent. "

(3) The accused himself. The accused may have a different
belief from that of his comrades, and such a belief may be based
on either superior knowledge or delusion." He may, on the other
hand, have the same belief.
In combination, the above variables constitute the eight possible major
combinations which may be used in testing for hazardous duty. Each of these
broad categories can be varied somewhat to form sub-categories, but they will
retain the same basic considerations as the major category. Thus, a determination as to what would objectively be considered hazardous duty may be judged
only the beginning and not the end of the relevant inquiry.
In determining how much weight to give to each of the variables mentioned above, it must be remembered that the statute is primarily designated
to deter human conduct caused by a particular state of mind-fear of potential danger. Since people act on their beliefs as to what the facts are, and not
on the actual facts when unknown, primary emphasis must be placed on subjective considerations, i.e., whether it was believed that the duty was hazardous.
The term "belief as to hazard" is only a shorthand way of saying a belief as
to a casualty rate for the activity high enough to cause a significant number
of people to go AWOL. When the belief of the accused and the totality of
the group we are interested in detering coincide, it would seem that such belief
should conclude the question. 2 Where they diverge, it would appear that the
objective facts should be dispositive.
For example, if the accused and his comrades believe that a certain duty
will cause a fatality rate of 25 %, and such rate will cause an appreciable number of absences to avoid the duty, a soldier who goes AWOL to avoid the duty
should be punished as a deserter although the rate is only .025% because of
51 See E.T.O. 11258, Pergolizzi, 24 E.T.O. 65 (1945) (fear of dead bodies).
52 E.T.O. 14510, Collins, 28 E.T.O. 11 (1945), is reasonably susceptible of being read
this way. There the board of review said at 12-13:
The Board of Review will take judicial notice that on 22 March 1945
the allied armies had no bridgehead across the Rhine, south of that at
Remagen, more than 50 miles to the north of Oppenheim, and that on the night
of 22 March the Third Army made its historic assault boat crossing of the
Rhine, at Oppenheim. The question is therefore squarely presented whether
prospective participation in that crossing was hazardous duty reasonably apparent to accused. The proof does not show the location of enemy troops,
and that fact is too specific for judicial notice. However, the Rhine was the
last great barrier before the heart of Germany, a broad river, and one crossed
by invasion seldom in history. What perils lay beyond it were not then
known, but it must have been evident to accused as it was to the world that
the Germans must protect it or abandon any hope of peace without defeat.
It could not have been anything but a fearful prospect, a dangerous and
hazardous venture, and the court could rightly infer that 'accused intended
to avoid it.
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the need to deter the members of the unit from avoiding performance. Conversely, if both accused and the group believe the casualty rate to be nil, and
accused shirks the duty, imposition of the heavier penalty is not necessary because the supposed lack of peril causes no absences through fear even though
in actuality the duty is dangerous and hence the heavier deterrent is unnecessary.
Where the accused is right about the nature of the duty and the group
is wrong, it would seem that his state of mind should govern. It would be
incongruous to punish a soldier who knew duty was safe more heavily merely
because his friends were wrong; conversely, to let a soldier who had more
facts and knew duty was perilous escape with a lighter penalty because his
information was more accurate than that of his comrades opens up a large
loophole in the law unrelated to his individualized fault. In such cases individualized deterrence would seem more appropriate. This is true even though
others who went AWOL to avoid the same duty with a different belief might
be differently penalized. The superior knowledge or insight of accused warrants a special treatment.
Where the group's belief is correct, and accused is under a delusion, it
would seem that accused's case should be governed by the belief of the group.
Aside from the unlikelihood that accused will have a bona fide belief different
from that of the group where the latter's belief is in fact accurate, the primary
consideration in such a situation is the deterrent effect of the treatment of
accused on his fellows. Thus, where duty is safe and the group knows it, there
is no necessity for imposition of an especially heavy penalty on accused to deter
others merely because he believes it to be dangerous. Conversely, where duty
is perilous and known to be such to the unit, lenient treatment of accused because he believes the duty to be harmless risks other defections among the
group by those who hope for similar treatment and are perhaps ready to feign
a like belief. In this case, it is of importance that the group belief is correct
because superiors cannot disabuse them of the fear by showing them the true
facts as can be done when accused knows the duty is safe and the group
erroneously believes otherwise.
The question of whether the test for important non-hazardous service
should be a subjective or objective one rests on entirely different considerations.
Aside from the few cases of disaffection, (i.e., dislike of country, military service,
unit, or superior," and evasion of duty as a result of such dislike,) such avoidance usually stems from disinterest or indifference, or the unpleasant, disagreeable, or onerous nature of the duty. Such facts often result in servicemen preferring a few days of imprisonment for AWOL to performance of duty. By
hypothesis, however, they will be deterred from shirking duty if they are treated
as a deserter. Such a situation favors a completely objective test, i.e., regardless of the intent or knowledge of accused, if the duty shirked is important, he
is guilty of the crime. This rule would have the tendency to encourage wouldbe shirkers to carefully inquire as to the importance of the duty before going
AWOL, and not to go AWOL when the duty is important, which is precisely
53

Cf. McCune v. Kilpatrick, supra note 38.
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the conduct the statute is designed to foster. Of course, where facts subsequent
to the AWOL change the prospective nature of the duty, these facts cannot
be considered.5 4
It might be noted that the above policy is diametrically opposed to that
governing hazardous duty. Aside from revealing enough so that soldiers will
not be overconfident, and will be prepared for hazard, no commander will
deliberately scare his troops by telling them that one out of four will die before
the day is past, even if he knows this is true. If anything, he will try to buoy
up the men's hopes and minimize the risks to avoid panic, rather than reveal
the gruesome details. Accordingly, we do not want servicemen engaged in
hazardous undertakings to inquire too closely as to the precise hazard, and
hence the law should not be framed to encourage this.
The converse is true as to important duty. Every commander will try to
impress on his subordinates the importance of their tasks, even when they are
not really vital. When the activity is so significant that one who shirks it is
a deserter, commanders are likely to shout this from the housetops. To encourage
absentees to make relevant inquiry is therefore a legitimate and desirable
objective. Where the activity is hazardous as well as important, as many
duties are, the motive dominating accused's mind should govern. This will
typically be a desire to avoid hazardous duty.5"
E. Conclusion
The short desertion statute was originally created to punish an intent considered particularly pernicious to military success, but its framers never considered many of the problems which arise from the interpretation of the statute
as regards the nature of the intent required. To pretend that decisions in
respect to questions of intent stem from legislative history or Congressional
desire is to decoy the guileless with a transparent fiction. Because of the absence
of consideration given to such factors at the time the statute was framed and
passed, resolution of the problems in this area must be based on policy considerations. It is believed that the above suggestions constitute appropriate
choices of policy in this field.

SNEDEXER, op. cit. supra note 41.
55 Cf. E.T.O. 8610, Blake, 19 E.T.O. 345,346 (1945), where the board of review declared:
"From his abandonment of his comrades as they went into battle, the court could reasonably
infer that his intent was cowardly."

54

